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K. E. MCCONNELL*

Reflections on the Ohio Decision
ABSTRACT
The logic of measuring the economic loss from pollution events is
compelling. Yet when losses occur in the form of nonuse values,
the contingent valuation method (CVM) is the only satisfactory
approach to measuring the damages. The Ohio decision affirmed
the validity of nonuse values and the role of contingent valuation
in measuring these values. This decision, combined with the ongoing practicesof economists, establishes contingent valuation as
an acceptable method of measuring damages. Challengers to CVM
bear the burden of proving CVM unreliable.Cummings and Harrison argue that the Ohio court might have made different decision had they considered all of the available evidence on CVM.
They assemble conceptual arguments and empirical evidence in
their attempt to prove the unreliabilityof the CVM. The empirical evidence from CVM is weak but it is sufficiently systematic so
that one cannot argue that CVM responses are purely random. In
the absence of an alternativehypothesis about what respondents
do when they answer CVM questions, it is reasonable to accept
CVM of economic damages.
INTRODUCTION
It is a challenge to respond to the critique of contingent valuation by Professors Cummings and Harrison (CH). 1 The title of their
paper "Was the Ohio Court Well Informed in Their Assessment of the
Accuracy of the Contingent Valuation Method" belies its breadth. It is
true that CH are motivated by what they regard as the meager and ambiguous evidence available t. the court in its affirmation of the contingent valuation method (CVM); however, their paper is best regarded
as a critique of CVM. The authors' statement of their goal is worth repeating:
It is our view that the three studies considered by the court
do not constitute the state of the art of our understanding of
the relationship between CVM values and values that reflect
real economic commitment. A comprehensive understand*Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland,College
Park, MD 20742
1. R. Cummings & G. Harrison, Was the Ohio court Well Informed in Their Assessment
of the Accuracy of the Contingent Valuation Method, 34 Nat. Res. J.Vol. 1 (1994).
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ing of the state of the art relevant for this issue may well result in a view of the potential for overestimates of value by
the CVM that is much less sanguine than that adopted by
the Ohio court. The purpose of our paper is to provide this
understanding by critically reviewing the current state of the
2
art in the economics literature.
The part worth emphasizing is "potential for overestimates"
in this statement. If CVM simply leads to estimates of values which
are on average correct, but have large, mean zero, errors, it is not different from the results based on behavioral methods of benefit estimation. Naturally CH are concerned about the size of the errors, but
it seems safe to say that it is the potential for upward bias that concerns them most.
The Department of Interior (DOI)regulations which were considered by the Ohio decision and are relevant for the CH critique concerned in part methods of damage assessment. The DOI regulations
suggested a hierarchy of valuation techniques, from market price to
behavioral methods to contingent valuation, in effect making CVM inferior to other approaches. Both environmental and industry groups
challenged this conclusion, naturally for different ends. Industry basically argued that CVM does not rise to the status of a "best available
procedure". 3 Industry's real concern, however, was that "respondents
do not actually pay money and likely will overstate their willingness
to pay."4 The Ohio decision struck down the DOI guidelines, holding
that CVM was a suitable approach to valuation.
The basis of the CH critique is both conceptual and empirical.
On conceptual grounds, they argue that evidence from experimental
economics and behavioral methods is not valid support for CVM. By
reviewing individual studies, they conclude that studies comparing
cash values with CVM estimates do not demonstrate the validity of
CVM. Their approach is to refute the evidence that purports to show
that CVM estimates are valid and reliable estimates of true willingness
to pay.
The CH critique is a unique contribution to the CVM literature.
There are many surveys by proponents of CVM which marshal evidence in support of CVM. And there are numerous attacks on CVM
which typically proceed out of their own surveys. But the CH critique
is an ambitious attempt to criticize CVM.
2. Id. at 93. It is an overstatement to say that the court considered only three studies.
They may have cited only three, but they had access to many studies and survey work

of many more.
3. Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
4. Id.
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The CH critique comes at a critical point in the development
of CVM. During 1992 the Exxon Corporation hosted a two day conference. A disinterested observer would likely say that the goal of the
conference was to discredit CVM. Following this conference, the Department of Commerce appointed a review panel of distinguished
economists to consider whether CVM is an acceptable approach to assess damages to natural resources. This panel released its report in
January 1993. This report,- while attempting to put to rest many arguments about CVM, basically restated *best practice procedures' already adopted by CVM researchers. This debate was instigated by the
magnitude of potential liabilities for responsible parties, reaching into
the billions of dollars.
It is customary to equate, incorrectly, CVM with non-use or existence values (though CH are not guilty of this). In the context of damage assessment, there are many cases where the damage occurs to users
of natural resources but there is no evidence of behavioral change. The
lack of evidence is a consequence of the informal nature of the activity, not a lack of damage. A good example was the case of PCBs in New
Bedford harbor, where contamination from PCBs had persisted for
decades. When the spill was publicized, there was no measure of prespill recreational services for the harbor. By the time of the damage assessment, any behavioral method for valuing recreational losses was
infeasible. One may argue about the magnitude of damages to recreational users of the harbor and surrounding waters, but there is no doubt
that without some form of contingent valuation, no damage assessment
for use values would be possible. So, it is not simply the "existence"
values that are at stake in this debate: For many natural resource damage cases, there is no possibility of establishing behavioral evidence
and so all value is at stake.
THE NATURE OF THE ARGUMENT
The critique by CH is carefully written, and its terms, goals,
and conclusions are given cautiously and conditionally. In order to
make better targets of them, I will restate them. First is the concept of
"real economic commitment," a well-turned phrase featured throughout the CH paper. In the absence of other information, almost anyone
would choose a method based on "real economic commitment" rather
than "contingent valuation." However, although there is no explicit definition of a "real economic commitment," CH implicitly equate "real
5. K. Arrow et al., Report of the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation (Jan. 11, 1993)
(U.S. Department of Commerce).
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economic commitment" with actual "willingness to pay." 6 Consequently, I substitute "willingness to pay" for "real economic commitment." This has the virtue of demystifying a seemingly powerful phrase
while at the same time putting it on par with other assessments of CVM
and economics in general.
Based on the issues raised in the Ohio decision, and on CH's
own statement, I distill (and perhaps overstate) a conclusion of the CH
paper as follows:
A comprehensive understanding of the state of the art of CVM
would
lead to the view that CVM overstates willingness to
7
pay.
While this statement is stronger than that made by CH, who wish only
to provide an understanding of the potential for overstatement by CVM,
it is a reasonable interpretation of their sentiments. The alternative conclusions about the method, (1) that CVM has large but mean zero errors, or (2) that CVM underestimates real economic commitment, are
far less interesting. Further, the potential for overestimation was argued
to the Ohio court-an argument the court declined to accept.
CH pursue their goal in a logical manner which is especially
valuable because of its link to the Ohio decision. CH begin their analysis on the themes of "necessity" and a "guaranty of trustworthiness"
The criterion of "necessity" involves two components:
1) The need for evidence upon which to base damage assessment which Congress has mandated; and
2) there is no better evidence than that produced by CVM.
The "guaranty of trustworthiness" can be interpreted to mean that the
process of CVM is reliable. CH imply that "guaranty of trustworthiness" would be threatened by "dangers of faulty memory, dangers of
faulty perception, dangers of faulty narration, and dangers of insincerity on the part of survey respondents." 8 "Guaranty of trustworthiness" means that the questioning part of the CVM process works the
way an impartial observer would want it to work. That is, respondents
know their economic values and give them honesty.
NECESSITY
"Necessity" is raised in the introduction to the CH critique, but
not really addressed thereafter. CH quote from an earlier case to de6. Here and throughout I will use willingness to pay as a stand-in for compensating
or equivalent variation. It is not meant to imply that willingness to pay is always the
best choice, but rather the simplest expression for the right concept, equivalent or
compensating variation. There is so far little empirical evidence that equivalent and
compensating variation are different for services of natural resource assets, so it seems
safe to use willingness to pay.
7. Cummings & Harrison, supra note 1, at 93.

8. Id. at 93.
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fine "necessity" as a compelling reason for accepting survey data. "Necessity" means two things: 1) We need some way of measuring value;
and 2) we need CVM because nothing else works.
It is therefore reasonable to ask whether CVM is "necessary."
This requires looking at the alternatives. The first alternative is to assume that non-use damages are zero.9 If these damages were zero, then
there would be no need to proceed. For those who are skeptical of CVM
and who also doubt the concept of non-use values, this is an attractive
option. However, there is an important hitch. In many damage cases,
the standard methods for estimating use values, such as travel cost and
hedonic models, are not applicable because the injury occurred sufficiently far in the past for time to have wiped out evidence or memories of behavioral changes. Hence, for use values, there are many kinds
of damage cases where there are no alternatives to CVM. Part of "necessity" stems from the importance of use values.
"Necessity" also applies to non-use or existence values and
needs to be examined further. The following methods are potential alternatives to CVM for measuring non-use values:
1) What the public sector has spent to prevent, ameliorate or
restore resources in similar situations;
2) Measures based on revealed preferences for public goods,
for example as proposed by Larson 0 based on Neill'sll work; and
3) Measures derived from the recognition that non-market funding emerges for market failure, of which the Nature Conservancy and
United Way are examples.
The first method has been considered for natural resource damage assessments. The argument is that if we could determine what government spends to clean up resources or provide equivalent services
in similar situations, we could use this as a measure of damages when
services from resources are lost. This is sort of "back door" benefits
transfer, except that costs and not benefits are transferred. If one assumes that the benefits of government projects roughly equal the costs,
then these costs, when transferred to the resource at hand, could stand
for benefits. However, this is a difficult assumption. Even with efficient
government investment, we require only that costs not exceed benefits
and that marginal benefits equal marginal costs. So all else equal, in
principle there is a natural tendency to underestimate benefits (or damages) when using costs as a proxy. In practice, this method is subject
to all of the problems of benefits transfers. There are many cases, for
9. This possibility leads many who are skeptical of CVM to support the method
because they think non-use values are real and positive.
10. D. Larson, FurtherResults on Willingness to Pay for Nonmarket Goods, 23 J. Envtl.
Econ. & Mgmt. 101 (1992).
11. H. Neil, Another Theorem on Using Markdet Demands to Determine Willingness to
Pay for Nontraded Goods, 15 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 224 (1988).
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example, the chronic PCB pollution in the New Bedford harbor, where
there will be no alternative costs because cleanup or restoration has
eluded our technical abilities. There are no cases of major cleanup of
PCB contamination (although substantial amounts of money have been
spent on preventing PCB contamination). Therefore, the proposal to
value damages via costs absorbed elsewhere is subject to the compound difficulties of benefits transfers and using costs as a measure of
benefits.
There are two difficulties with the second approach, which uses
restrictions implied by economic theory in a full-demand system to
value public goods.1 2 First, it relies heavily on knowing a priori whether
goods are net substitutes or complements with the public good. (There
is doubt that the theoretical structure will bear the weight. 13 ) Economists have little intuition about net substitute or complement relations
among commonly consumed goods, and practically no a priori basis
for classifying goods as net substitutes or complements with a public
good. Secondly, the empirical task of valuing public goods from data
or complete budgets seems vastly more difficult than designing successful CVM mechanisms.
The third approach is vague compared to the first two. It is argued that people will contribute to charities, medical research, and conservation of natural resources even though they will never use the services
of the resources they are helping to preserve. Do these voluntary payments provide a method of estimating the existence value of other services? Voluntary organizations which partially fund public goods at
least provide evidence of the presence of non-use values. However, there
is no guarantee that voluntary actions support the optimal level of services. (If we had v 6 luntary contributions for pollution control, it would
give a lower bound for the benefits of environmental improvements.
It is not clear how this lower bound would help in damage assessment.) Further, they do not provide a means of estimating values in
the absence of cash contributions. In fact, one of the few experiments
on cash versus CVM values for existence values was based on a Nature Conservancy appeal. 4 And in all cases of actual contributions for
public goods, free riding will make the cash values underestimate true
willingness to pay.
12. Larson, supra note 10, at 101. Larson's paper is based on a result in Neill, supra
note 11.
113. In a related paper, N. Bockstael & K. McConnell, Public Goods a Characteristicof
Non-Market Commodities, 103 Econ. J. 1244 (1903), demonstrate that it is quite difficult
even to classify closely related goods as Hicksian (or net) substitutes or compliments to
the public good, much less all goods. For example, consider water quality in a lake as
a public good and swimming at the lake as a private good. They will probably be gross
complements but not necessarily net complements.
14. See K. Ward & J. Duffield, Natural Resource Damages: Law and Economics 34650 (1992).
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Consequently, for both use and non-use values, the "necessity"
criterion is relevant. There are no practical alternatives to CVM for calculating damages for existence values, which is also frequently the case
for use values. The implication of "necessity" appears to be that CVM
would be used if there are no substitute measures. However, "necessity" does not provide a cogent reason for adopting CVM if there is evidence that CVM methods are systematically biased or so "noisy", i.e.
the results are complete nonsense, as to be worth little in decisions about
damages.
HOW WELL DOES CVM WORK?
CH interpret "guaranty of trustworthiness" to mean the need
to establish that there is not inappropriate strategic behavior and that
respondents are able and willing to give their true preferences. If inappropriate strategic behavior is absent, then comparing cash transactions with CVM can be informative. CH therefore assess several studies
which compare CVM with cash transactions. In reviewing their work,
I will focus on whether the evidence presented by CH might have led
the Ohio court to reconsider its conclusion that CVM does not overstate
true willingness to pay.
A. Strategic Behavior and CVM
The argument that respondents will strategically hide their true
WTP to influence outcomes to their benefit is one of the oldest concerns in the CVM literature. The two incentives are: bid low if the result will be used to make the respondent pay; bid high if the results
are to be used to provide more supply. The context will therefore determine which type of strategy threatens CVM.
Researchers have come to regard strategic hiding of true WTP
as one of the lesser problems of CVM for two reasons. First, as CVM
developed, the literature of experimental economics suggested, rightly
or not, that free-riding was net a major issue. Second, a series of studies designed to test for the presence of free-riding concluded that freeriding was an insignificant factor in CVM responses.
CH assess four studies designed to test for the impact of both
types of free-riding on CVM values.1 5 Brookshire, Ives, and Schulze
(BIS); and Rowe, d'Arge and Brookshire (RDB) tested whether there is
incentive to overbid to influence supply, whereas Bohm searched for
under-bidding and overbidding in different questions. CH conclude
15. These papers are: D. Brookshire et al., The Valuation of Aesthetic Preferences, 3 J.
Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 325 (1976); P. Bohm, Revealing Demand for an Actual Public Good,
24 J.Pub. Econ. 135 (1984); P. Bohm, Estimatingthe DemandforPublicGoods:An Experiment,
3 Eur. Econ. Rev. Ill (1972) [hereinafter Bohm-1972).
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that the BIS study "does not provide a basis for unequivocal conclusions regarding such [strategic) behavior" and that "one cannot appeal
the presence or absence
to... the [RDBI study as having established
6
of strategic behavior of the CVM."
CH re-analyze of Bohm's famous 1972 study using non-parametric methods. They reject parametric analysis of means on the basis
of the non-normality of the sample. The summary data from the Bohm
experiments supporting various inferences are in Table 1. CH first assume that question VI.1 is most like a CVM question. Then they use a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric statistic to test the equality of
distributions of bids for VI.1 versus the other questions. As is evident
in Table 1, one cannot reject the hypothesis of equal distributions for
VI.1 and VI.2 (probability= .99). Therefore, if VI.2 leads to an underbid, one could conclude that CVM also underbids true WTP. CH then
observe that the distribution of bids from VI.1 equals the distribution
from V at the 0.13 probability level. Assuming a traditional significance level (5 percent or 10 percent) for rejection, they are unable to
reject the hypothesis that distribution V equals distribution VI.1. Since
question V leads in principle to overbidding, the conclusion that VI.1
and V have the same distribution suggests CVM leads to overbidding.
The two taken together imply a contradiction: VI.1 versus VI.2 implies
that CVM underbids while VI.1 versus V implies CVM that overbids.
Neither can be rejected. This leads CH to conclude that "there is no
that CVM values are the same as real ecosupport here for the view
17
nomic commitment."
Table I
CH Re-analysis of Bohm (1972)
Question

CH hypothesis Mean (SEK) Median (SEK) n

KolmogorovSmirnov test*

I
II

underbid

7.6

5

23

.018

?

8

29

.24

III

?
?

8.8
7.3

29

overbid

7.7
8.4

5
5
7

.011
.058
.13

like CVM

10.2

10

59

--

underbid

10.3

10

59

.99

IV
V
VI.1
VI.2

37
39

*This test is the probability that the distribution of bids of the question is the
same as the distribution of bids for question VI.1.
16. Cummings & Harrison, supra note 1, at 93.
17. Id. at 93.
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CH's conclusion is contestable on several grounds. First, it is possible
to obtain higher or lower aggregate WTP from equal or different distributions. For most aggregation schemes, central tendencies will be
good indicators of aggregate WTP. Therefore, why not test a measure
of central tendency, such as a non-parametric test of difference between
medians? Further, given the choice, the Ohio court would probably not
have been indifferent between:
(i) Accepting the equality of distributions VI.1 and VI.2 with
probability .99;
and
(ii) Accepting the equality of distributions VI.1 and V with probability .13.
Because of its higher likelihood, the better choice would obviously be
VI.2, leading to the conclusion that CVM underestimates WTP.
Furthermore, a different comparison might have made CH's conclusion that CVM may both under-and overestimates WTP more difficult. For example, question IV arguably leads to overbidding, yet one
can reject the hypothesis that the distributions of IV and VI.1 are equal
(with probability .058). Therefore, although the Bohm results are fascinating, the ambiguous results derived from tests on differences should
be taken skeptically. Most important, there is certainly no strong evidence from the initial analysis or re-analysis of the Bohm data that would
lead one to conclude that CVM overestimates true WTP.
If the Ohio court had been privy to the CH analysis of the four
papers on strategic behavior, would their decision have been different?
That is, is there sufficient evidence in the CH analysis to lead one to
believe that strategic behavior induces systematic inflation of CVM responses? I think the answer is no. The null hypothesis is: CVM bids are
similar regardless of the presence or absence of incentives to behave
strategically.1 8 This hypothesis tends not to get rejected because, in general, the studies do not provide convincing evidence regarding the influence of strategic behavior. The testimony given before the Department
of Commerce panel of experts bears this out. In hearings held before
this panel, few economists presenting evidence against the validity of
CVM (other than experimental economists) showed concern for strategic behavior.
There is a curious twist to the way the debate is carried out,
however. By forming the null hypothesis that CVM is the same with
and without incentives for strategy, we have made CVM the conventional wisdom. Thus, the onus falls on those who doubt CVM to dis18. Incentives for strategically understating willingness to pay exist, for example, in
Bohm's question I, where he states "By stating small amount, smaller than you are
actually willing to pay, you stand the chance of being able to watch the program without
paying so much." Bohm-1972, supra note 15, at 128.
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prove it. This is implicit in the Ohio court's argument and in the evidence provided by CH. This also seems to be the way the NOAA panel
worked. That is, they looked for evidence to disprove CVM. It reflects
a change in the way CVM is viewed. A decade ago it is more likely
that the null hypothesis would have been "CVM does not work" so
that failure to reject a null would be evidence against CVM. However,
in the current environment, the mere failure to reject the null hypothesis means support of CVM. Given the noisy nature of CVM results
(and indeed all econometric results), it is difficult to disprove. If one
had to take the same evidence available to CH to prove that CVM does
not lead to strategic behavior, the results would be equally inconclusive.
B. The Evidence from Experimental Economics
CVM researchers have used experimental results to support the
idea that free-riding is not significant. Therefore, CH devote a lengthy
section of their paper to discussing the relevance of such results to
CVM. The most important conclusion that CH reich about experimental economics is that it is not relevant to CVM studies, or as CH
put it, "[vialuation institutions used in experimental economics are very
different from those used in CVM. There is no unequivocal evidence
suggesting that subject behavior in CVM is sufficiently 'like' subject
behavior in experimental institutions." 19 They are indeed different and
the Ohio court would have had an easy time seeing it. This conclusion
is one of the significant contributions of the CH critique. Experimental economics has not yet demonstrated that dissembling strategic behavior is an influential determinant of CVM responses.
THE EVIDENCE: CVM VERSUS OTHER METHODS OF
VALUATION
To determine whether CVM overestimates true WTP, it is necessary to know the "truth". Indeed, this was one of the key concerns
raised by the NOAA Blue Ribbon panel, who argue that "External validation of the CV method remains an important issue. A critically important contribution could come from experiments in which... CV studies
are.., compared with "real" behavioral willingness to pay .... " 2o CH
analyze some of the studies which compare values derived from CVM
with other values. Two kinds of alternatives are available for comparison. One is the estimation of value with so-called "behavioral methods", such as travel cost or hedonic models, which only estimate WTP.
The second is actual cash values, which may be taken as the "truth".
19. Id. at 103.

20. See Arrow, supra note 5, at 9.
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A. Values from CVM versus Values from Behavioral Methods
There is a lengthy tradition of comparing contingent valuation
with values from behavioral models. In the CVM literature, when comparisons show CVM values to be similar to values estimated from be-

havioral methods, then "convergent validity" 21 is said to hold. CH
argue that these studies "offer little in the way of substantive evidence
one way or another." 22 This argument has a certain logic. Travel cost
and hedonic models are themselves estimates, and have been compared

with cash transactions even less frequently than CVM. 23 However, the
criterion of "necessity" as perceived by the Ohio court concerns not

whether CVM is perfect, but whether there are practical alternatives to
CVM. Furthermore, if travel cost and hedonic models are viewed as ac-

ceptable in the damageassessment process (as implied in the Ohio decision) and in addition yield answers which are comparable to CVM
answers, then there is some indirect support for the court's use of CVM.
Consequently, in terms of behavioral evidence CH let stand what is a

roughly supportive body of evidence comparing CVM with behavioral
methods. If one adopts the null hypothesis that CVM works, then their
section on behavioral versus CVM values does nothing to weaken our
belief in this hypothesis.
B. CVM Results and Cash Payments

CH assess nine studies which compare actual cash payments

with CVM estimates of WTP. 24 Three of the studies are unpublished,

21. The behavioral models include hedonic models and travel cost models. Summaries
can be found in R. Mitchel & R. Carson, Using Surveys to Value Public Goods: The
Contingent Valuation Methods (1989) and additional studies in Ward & Duffield, supra
note 14, at 342-346.
22. Cummings & Harrison, supra note 1, at 93.
23. Outside of R. Bishop & T. Heberlein, Measuring Values of Extra Market Goods: Are
Indirect Measures Biased?, 61 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 926 (1979), 1 can think of no instance of
comparing behavioral methods with cash.
24. Cummings & Harrison, supra note 1, at 93 noting Bishop & Heberlein, supra note
23; Bishop et al., ContingentValuationof EnvironmentalAssets: Comparisonswith a Simulated
Market, 23 Nat. Res. J. 619 (1983); R. Boyce et al., Experimental Evidence of Existence Value
in Payment and Compensation Contexts, in Western Regional Research Project W-133:
Benefits and Costs in Natural Resource Planning (K. Boyle & T. Heekin eds., July 1, 1989)
(Interim Report 2, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of
Maine); R. Cummings et al., Measuring the Elasticity of Substitution of Wages for Municipal
Infrastructure:A Comparison of the Survey and Wage Hedonic Approach, 13 J. Envtl. Econ.
& Mgmt. 269 (1986); M. Dickie et al., Market Transactionsand Hypothetical Demand Data:
A Comparative Study, 82 J. Am. Stat. Ass'n 69 (1987). J. Duffield & D. Patterson, Field
Testing Existence Values: An Instream Flow Trust Fund for Montana Rivers (1992)
(unpublished draft manuscript, Departement of Economics, University of Montana); M.
Kealy et al., Reliability and Predictive Validity of Contingent Values: Does the Nature of the
Good Matter, 19 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 244 (1990); H. Neill, Hypothetical Surveys,
Provision Rules, and Real Economic Commitments (1992) (unpublished manuscript,
Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of South
Carolina); K. Seip & J. Strand, Willingness to Pay for Environmental Goods in Norway
91989) (unpublished manuscript, Department of Economics, SAF Center for Applied
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two by Cummings and Harrison and associates, and the other by Seip
and Strand. 25 The studies and their attributes are shown in Table 2.
With respect to private goods, the published studies at least
show that CVM cannot be rejected as outlandish or ludicrous. However, comparisons between CVM and cash payments for public goods
encounter the problem of free riding. Although there may be grounds
for arguing that free riding is absent from the CVM, the same cannot
be said of cash payment for public goods. If it were possible to have
true WTP expressed by voluntary cash payments for public goods, then
there would be far less need for benefit estimation techniques in general and CVM in particular. Government provision is necessary because
free riding undermines the voluntary provision of public goods.
Table 2
Comparisons of Contingent Valuation and Cash Transactions
Study

Nature of
good

According to CH,
supportive of CVM Published?

Dickie, Fisher,
and Gerking

private

no

yes

Bishop and
Heberlein (1979)

private

no

yes

Bishop, Herberlein
and Kealy

private

ambiguous

yes

Boyce et al.

private?

no

yes

Neill et al.

private

no

no

Cummings et al.

private

'ambiguous

no

private/public

ambiguous

yes

Seip and Strand

public

no

no

Duffield and
Patterson

public

no/ambiguous

yes

Kealy et al.

Research, University of Oslo, Norway)). There is an additional study in the section, C.
Stellar, J. Stoll and J.-P. Chavas Validation of Empirical Measures of Welfare Change 61

Land Econ. 156 (1985) which compares travel cost models with CV results. It is odd that
this study is assessed here, given CH's position on comparisons of behavioral methods
with CV.

25. See supra note 24.
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Consequently, the results from Table 2 pertaining to public
goods are not surprising. One cannot find support from Kealy et al.26,
Seip & Strand 27, or Duffield & Patterson 28 for CVM. Each of these studies suggests that CVM overestimates WTP for public goods as revealed
in a voluntary mechanism, which is precisely what one would expect.
In contrast, the evidence concerning private goods is supportive. However, as in the case of strategic behavior, the implications of these studies depend strongly on what informal null hypothesis one holds. If, as
the Ohio court seems to assume, CVM is a suitable null hypothesis, then
this relatively weak assemblage of evidence fails to dislodge it.
Nonetheless, CH conclude that the comparisons of CVM with
other methods do not support CVM. Their conclusions, in simplified
form, are:
(1) Strategic behavior may be important in CVM;
(2) Behavioral methods do not test the reliability of CVM because they are equally noisy; and
(3) Cash transactions have not shown that CVM is reliable.
As suggested above, the cogency of these conclusions depends
strongly on the null hypothesis held by the reader. Or more informally,
if one has some initial belief in the validity and reliability of CVM, the
evidence assembled by CH is not likely to be strong enough to dislodge
one's belief. On the other hand, neither is the evidence sufficiently favorable to convince a skeptic that CVM works. CH argue that neither
internal CVM studies nor the evidence from experimental economics
establish the absence of inappropriate strategic behavior. But CH have
not shown that strategic behavior exists in CVM. Indeed, with respect
to behavioral methods, CH leave intact evidence which has provided
considerable support for CVM. Furthermore, while it is certainly true
that behavioral methods lead to noisy estimates of WTP, there is little
arguments that these methods lead to systematic bias. Finally, while it
is reasonable to conclude that tests of cash payments have not shown
CVM yields reliable estimates of WTP for public goods, it is difficult
to conceive of a mechanism which would provide a good CVM-cash
test for public goods untainted by free riding. This is likely to be a persistent point of argument between CVM supporters and detractors.
How does one assemble evidence that CVM works or fails to work for
public goods? One approach not addressed by CH is the possibility of
comparing CVM referenda with the actual results of voting.
These issues will be argued again and again. The publication
of the Blue Ribbon report 29 is unlikely to temper the debate (although
26.
27.
28.
29.

See Kealy et al., supra note 24.
See Seip & Strand, supra note 24.
See Duffield & Patterson, supra note 24.
Arrow et al., supra note 5.
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it may have some impact on litigation). CH's fundamental difficulty
in (figuratively) convincing the Ohio court is the "noisiness" of their
evidence. If the court and economists initially presume CVM is correct, the evidence has to be stronger to rebut this presumption. In terms
of their goal, however, CH have succeeded in establishing that CVM
results are ambiguous, although they have not provided convincing
evidence that CVM consistently overestimates true WTP. Nevertheless,
the great virtue of the CH paper is its attempt to evaluate CVM in a
critical but unbiased way.
CONCLUSION: WHERE ARE THE MODELS?
Inevitably, as the debate about CVM as a valid method turns
to questions of the validity of individual studies, researchers focus on
individual CVM questions and respondents' reactions to them. Here
the waters get quite muddied. Economists are not intellectually equipped
for this kind of debate, for at least two reasons. First, knowledge about
of the process by which people answer economic or CVM-type questions is limited, and what exists is not widely distributed (due in part
to the secrecy of adversarial proceedings). Secondly, and perhaps the
most important reason for the sorry state of the debate about CVM, is
the absence of testable models to explain how people answer questions.
The only models currently available to researchers are neoclassical behavioral or valuation models.
The potential importance of models for answering CVM questions is evident from the regularity of empirical research. For example, discrete choice or referendum models are seductive in the way that
higher required payments for public goods regularly induce greater
proportions of "nos" just as lower required payments induce a higher
proportion of "yeses". The results cut across time, survey method, type
of public good, and country. They tend to be more regular than behavioral methods. Interpretation and aggregation may pose problems,
but no more so than with behavioral methods.
Thus regularity results create problems in an entirely different
way from the anomalies, such as embedding effects or the discrepancy
between willingness to pay and willingness to sell. These regularity
results are entirely consistent with a model of economic preferences.
Critics of CVM have responded by developing more complicated questions. 30 However, even though one may obtain contradictory results
by, for example, using embedded questions involving various sequences
of services, this does not detract from the first order regularity of ref30. One may interpret D. Kahneman & J.Knetsch, (Valuing Public Goods: The Purchase
of Moral Satisfaction), 22 1. Enwtl Econ. & Mgmt. 57 (1992) and K. Boyle, W. Desvousges,
F Johnson, R. Dunford and S. Hudson An Investigation of Part-Whole Biases in ContingentValuation Studies, 27 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 64 (1994) in this light.
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erendum models. From the perspective of the debate over CVM, the
problem is the absence of a satisfactory alternative hypothesis for the
simplest referendum models. To advance the debate on CVM, it would
be helpful to develop a model of how people answer questions. Such
a model would provide an alternative to the implicit assumption that
the model that induces consistent responses is a neoclassical preference model.
The argument that CVM responses bear no relation to rational
behavior appears to be wrong when judged by the evidence from referendum models. However, the options need not be limited to "noise"
versus true WTP because respondents may answer questions consistently yet not reveal their true WTP. Here is where models of answering can play a role.
To establish the validity of CVM estimates of non-use values,
researchers must rely on evidence internal to CVM, rather than comparisons with estimates from other approaches. Free riding in cash
transactions for public goods makes comparison to cash experiments,
such as that by Duffield and Patterson, suspect. Furthermore, behavioral methods cannot yield estimates of non-use values. The idea of
models for answering questions is alien to economists. Such models
should have several characteristics. They ought to provide testable implications of questions, alternative hypotheses to true WTP, and if motives like "please the interviewer" or "warm glow" are truly what
motivate people, they ought to provide testable hypotheses.

